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HORST RUTHROF 
Meaning is  not well  described as  a merely linguistic notion. Yet in  the 
majority of  works in semantics, what someone means by doing something 
is  strictly  separated  from  what  a  linguistic  expression  means,  what a 
visual sign means, what an action means, and from what all this means. 
What tends to be looked at is the meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence; 
in  short,  the meaning  of a  linguistic  expression  on its  own  or in  the 
context of other expressions. To simplify, the meaning of such an expres-
sion is  then secured by showing how its structure, its syntax, is  related 
to a broader linguistic context and a referential background. This back-
ground  is  usually  summed  up as  'the  world',  as,  for  instance,  in  the 
naturalist.approach defended by Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny ( 1990). 
A further step in this direction is the formalization of both syntax and 
world into a tertium comparationis, a fully formalized language, such that 
natural language and world can be compared without loss  or surplus.1 
This has been the arena of  formal semantics which has achieved formida-
ble  complexity,  a  complexity,  however,  of a  very  different  kind  if we 
compare  it  with  that found  in  natural languages.  From the  work  of 
Rudolf Carnap (e.g.  1967b)  to  that,  for  instance,  of John N.  Martin 
(1987)  the  formal  tradition has  not only  played its  separate  scientific 
language  games  but has  also  had a  powerful influence  on non-formal 
semantics. 
I shall address these and related issues elsewhere and concentrate here 
on presenting an alternative starting point. In doing so I draw on a range 
of writers and fields:  among others, from Peirce to Eco, from Husserl to 
Heidegger, from Frege to Davidson; from semiotics to analytical philoso-
phy,  from  Reinach's phenomenological speech act theory to Derrida's 
critique of Searle.  What unites these disparate writers and fields  in this 
project is the holistic assumption that meaning is best described if it can 
address under one broad theoretical umbrella what is meaningful in  toto 
to  a community,  as  well  as  the meanings of specific  significatory acts: 
from  reading  a  specific  visual  impression  to  a  gesture  of regret,  the 
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utterance of a complex sentence in a natural language, reading a traffi 
sign, a chemical formula, or a digital identification.2  c 
We  must ask,  of course,  whether we  are not in danger of losing all 
precision of description if  we open up the field of  meaning in this manner. 
No  doubt  there  are  risks.  But  I  suggest  that  much  of the  precision 
achieved on account of a narrow focus is a precision of theoretical tools 
rather than a precision in accounting for what actually goes on. In other 
words,  the  more  precise  we  are  in  formalizing  natural languages,  the 
more likely we are to miss significant aspects of the object of inquiry. 
There is,  unfortunately, no neutral standard against which we  could 
judge the success of competing methods. The only available tests are the 
relative comparison between the competing descriptions themselves, each 
with its special relationship between the target language and a suitable 
metalanguage on the one hand and, on the other, the comparison between 
such descriptions and our intuitive grasp of what we  sense is  going on. 
The chosen relation between definiendum (a natural language) and defini-
ens  (a  metalanguage)  predetermines to  a  considerable degree  what we 
will  find.  I believe that our method of investigation must ultimately be 
guided by our intuitive grasp of how meanings are typically produced. 
And  if a  semantics  fails  both  to  cater  to  our  hunches  and  to  give 
persuasive reasons why we need to reject our common-sense notions, the 
theory needs to be given a hard look. 
To be sure, not all accomplishments in analytical and formal semantics 
are necessarily under attack in the present approach. A broad semiotic 
description  of meaning must be  able  to  grant formal  insights  a  place 
value in the larger picture. But what would such a larger picture look like? 
Alternative axioms 
Let me begin with a number of axiomatic assumptions. Suppose meaning 
is not in any way a feature of language, but a broader feature of social 
doing of which language is  a part. Let us  say that social doing of any 
kind is  regarded as meaningful or as meaningless by a community. The 
community could be a tiny group or encompass the people of the planet. 
If  an act is meaningful, even if  marginally and aberrantly so, it is interpret-
able; if it is meaningless, it is not. Or vice versa, if a community is  able 
to put an interpretation on an activity it is regarded to have meaning, if 
interpretation fails  it is  meaningless.  In this  crude  ontology,  then,  we 
have a world consisting of meaningful and meaningless acts. 
To  this  scenario  let  us  add an epistemic  perspective.  A  community 
knows  its  world  because  its  members  have  imposed  and  continue  to • 
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impose  a  significatory  matrix  on  whatever  there  is.  In other  words, 
everything  the  community  and its  members  can know they  know  via 
signs and not as such and in itself. This Peircean epistemic starting point, 
a semiotic  form  of a  Kantian insight,  furnishes  a  crucial part of the 
methodological axiomatics for everything that follows. 
In  this  picture,  there  are  no  non-signs,  at  least  not pragmatically 
speaking.  As  Peirce  insisted,  'we  think only  in signs'  (CP  2.302)  and 
'whenever we  think, we  have present to the consciousness some feeling, 
image,  conception, or other representation, which serves  as  a sign'  (CP 
5.283). Non-signs can of course be stipulated as the general transcenden-
tal  possibility for  signs,  without themselves  being knowable:  a kind of 
non-semiotic noumenon. For the purpose of describing meaning, though, 
this is of no further interest, since everything we can see, touch, and talk 
about is available to us only in the form of signs: more or less meaningful 
and very rarely meaningless.  3 
An important axiom in this general background is the assumption that 
meaning  is  the  realization  by  a  community  of the  relation  between 
different sign systems.  Members of the community are defined primarily 
by their ability to negotiate such relations according to the community's 
recipes  for  interpretation.  Following  a  Peircean  line  of argument,  we 
could  formulate  this  assumption  as  a  general  principle  which  I  have 
called  the  semiotic  corroboration  thesis.  According  to  this  principle, 
reality is  the result of the corroboration of one sign  system by at least 
one other sign system.  Or, more simply, reality occurs when signs from 
different significatory systems support one another.4 
The visual  image  of a tree is  meaningful because it can be and has 
been corroborated by tactile and other significations. I am able to recog-
nize by touch, i.e., classify as  a meaningful part of a set of experiences, 
a bolt underneath my car's gearbox even if I cannot see it because the 
tactile signification is corroborated by recollected visual signs (bolt-signs), 
as  well  as  other  signs.  Such  linkage  between  sign  systems  is  what 
Wittgenstein's term Lebensformen appears to point to, though he did not 
pursue  the  question  far  enough  to  allow  for  the  construal  of  a 
Wittgensteinian semiotic (Wittgenstein 1963). On the other hand, strong 
support for this  kind of thesis  can be  found,  for  instance, in Edmund 
Husserl's work on 'appresentation' (1973),  in some  papers by Roman 
Jakobson (1987), in Umberto Eco (1984), Thomas A. Sebeok (Sebeok 
1977;  1986),  as  well  as  in  Fernando  Poyates  ( 1982),  to name  a  few 
important signposts in the literature. 
The more complex signs that make up a sexist or racist comment are 
understood not alone on the grounds that they stand in a long linguistic 
chain of similar and already familiar verbal signs.  We  understand them 26  H.  Ruthrof 
because they are embedded in a web of non-linguistic signs such as speech 
stance,  construed  speech  attitude,  and,  importantly,  imagined,  quasi-
physical, social situations which in our example amount to an ugly world. 
A  useful  introduction  to  the  study  of language  against  this  kind  of 
problematic can be found, for example, in Cate Poynton (1986). 
Evidently,  we  are  not talking here  of sense  data.  If anything,  sense 
data could be  argued to be a supporting stage in the chain of meaning 
making,  but are  not  themselves  interpretive  perceptions  of any  kind. 
Retinal images are not meanings, though meanings are certainly produced 
with  their  help.  What we  should focus  on is  the  kind  of interpretive 
activity without which we  cannot make any sense  of how we  conduct 
our daily social routines in which sensory information and habitual acts 
of meaning constitution play their roles. And if interpretive processes are 
our focus  rather than the givenness  of physiological mechanisms,  then 
signs in Peirce's sense are the most promising starting point. 
The limits of the signified world 
Such a significatory picture of the world collapses traditional ontic and 
epistemic descriptions into the one field of semiosis. Having said this, we 
need to circumscribe our world a little more clearly in terms of its limits 
and structure. What are the limits of this world? The answer we will give 
here is not the suggestion made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, but its 
semiotic extension. The limits of our world are not constituted only by 
our language but by our sign systems in  toto:  the limits of our signs are 
the  limits  of our  world  ('Die  Grenzen  meiner  Sprache  bedeuten  die 
Grenzen meiner Welt', Wittgenstein 1963:  5.6). 
If we  say  that sign  systems  are  the  limits  of our world rather than 
accepting  'the  world'  as  an  empirical primitivum,  we  must clarify  the 
consequences of this assumption. Since we cannot know anything outside 
semiosis, the dynamic totality of signs, whatever world we so experience 
is a significatory or textual construct. Yet if we were not to say anything 
else  about this world,  this  textual reality would amount to a radically 
relativistic construal. Radical relativism, however, is marred by two fun-
damental impediments: self-contradiction and intersemiotic constraint. 
As  to self-contradiction, radical relativism is  incapable of arguing its 
own case consistently because it has demolished any non-relative basis 
on which  to  do  so.  This  is  its  methodological weakness.  In addition, 
radical relativism also  has  an impossible task in persuading us  that its 
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of our tools of inquiry. This point can be made clearer by the notion of 
intersemiotic constraints. 
Let us  understand intersemiotic constraints  as  those  features  in  the 
diverse  sign systems of different communities, as,  for instance, cultures 
which in different ways point to the basic boundaries of being. Organic 
death, the fact that humans die if they drink mercury instead of water, 
the realization of gravity, the distinctions between the starry sky and the 
firm  earth  are  all  signified  consistently,  however  differently,  in  quite 
unrelated communities. From this and a vast amount of similarly corrob-
orating significations we must not conclude, as does a naive empiricism, 
that we have direct, i.e., non-significatory, access to 'the world'. We still 
live in a textually interpreted world. 
The conclusion which is  ineluctable is  that if there is  no evidence of 
any fundamentally different or contradictory significations on a range of 
basic matters concerning being, radically relativist explanations fail to be 
cogent. To be sure, the constraints which our various sign systems reflect 
are  still textual, those suggested by the latest tools of physics included, 
but they are massive.  The intersemiotic constraints of the sign systems 
of diverse  communities  form  a  frame  for  living  which  bounds  our 
intersubjective  world,  in  the  broadest  sense  of Husserl's  term.  What 
emerges from all this is that we must reject both the kind of metaphysical 
realism found, for instance, in naturalist accounts as well as all forms of 
'radical'  relativism.  In this  I  tend  to  follow  the  argument  offered  by 
Michael Dummett who finds both convictions unsatisfactory because 'it 
is unclear whether the realist's defence ... can be made convincing [and] 
whether the anti-realist's position can be made coherent' (1978: 24). 
Realist textualism 
An attractive solution to this old problem seems to me what I have called 
elsewhere a realist textualism. This is a position which acknowledges the 
reality of constraints, while at the same time emphasizing the textuality 
of everything we  can know;  including those very boundaries (Ruthrof 
1992a, 1992b ). Including the realist textualist perspective, we have so far 
sketched the following picture: there is the broad ontological category of 
doing or acts which are largely meaningful, though meaningless acts are 
also possible. The epistemic correction of this state of affairs is achieved 
by adding that none of this would be knowable were it not for significa-
tion. Whatever we know we know as signs. Reality is guaranteed by the 
corroboration of signs from different sign systems (visual, tactile, olfac-28  H  Ruthrof 
tory, proximic, auditory, verbal, gravitational, thermal, etc.) and meaning 
occurs as  the result of the relational instantiation of such signs. 
General semiosis has been stipulated as  that which gives cohesion to 
a  community  and  in  turn  is  sanctioned  by  the  community.  As  such 
semiosis  is  all  there is,  subsuming as  it does  both ontic and  epistemi~ 
perspectives. Rather than saying that our language constitutes the limits 
of our world, we have extended this to the claim that our sign systems 
are the limits of this world. We have asserted that we neither have access 
to the world outside signification nor are able to argue consistently for 
a  radical relativism.  Hence  we  are  forced  to  accept  something like  a 
realist textualism, a position which acknowledges the broad intersemiotic 
and intercultural agreement on fundamental constraints on the way in 
which we can textualize the world. At the same time a realist textualism 
insists that those very constraints are available only in the form of texts. 
Significatory acts 
The remainder of this paper is  designed to clarify and flesh  out some of 
these incipient observations, claims which I hope will gel into a coherent 
picture of an alternative approach to semantics: a community sanctioned 
directional theory of  meaning. To start with acts, why not argue for objects 
or states of affairs in the world? The preference of the notion of acts is 
partly an acknowledgment of the work of Husser! tempered by Peirce's 
emphasis on the control over meaning by a community.  In this  sense, 
objects  and  states  of affairs  as  well  as  all  else  are  subsumed  under 
significatory acts. While these acts have Brentano's and Husserl's direc-
tionality and certainly require  a  consciousness,  they  are  by no means 
merely mental or subjective. The acts we are speaking of here are species 
bound and socially  regulated  and hence  can be  performed by  typical 
members of the semiotic community, that is,  a community which  to  a 
significant degree shares and guides and is itself constituted by a common 
semiosis, the social semiotic (cf.  Hodge and Kress 1988). 
The preference of 'acts' over 'objects' also  suggests a dynamic rather 
than a static view of the background to meaning. All signs are enacted, 
so that the constitution of meaning is never a 'now' like some point in a 
coordinate system but a process which links into previous meaning consti-
tutions as well as subsequent ones. To use Husserl's notion of retentions 
and pro  tensions, meanings are acts which retain the shadow of  proceeding 
meanings  and,  by  way  of pro  tensions,  already  gear  into· subsequent 
meaning  events.  Nor should we  remain happy with  Husserl's  limited 
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(1973). Likewise, Umberto Eco's net of semantic relations is a compatible 
way of approaching the matter, as long as such a net is seen as a dynamic 
field  that  changes  its  total  structure  as  it  moves  along  its  historical 
trajectory (Eco 1979). 
What is the advantage of insisting on the significatory acts of knowing 
'the world'? Would we  not be  equally well  off by simply referring to a 
house as  a  'house' instead of insisting that we  can only be aware of a 
sign? Indeed, the fact that we put the metalinguistic version of the item 
in inverted commas suggests that we  are drawing the reader's attention 
to the sign quality of the word  ..  But why should our visual cognition of 
a house be  a sign? Why our tactile bumping into it?  Why our varying 
proxemic impressions as we drive past it? The commonplace assumption 
that all these processes point to the same 'item' without our ever being 
able  to  get  to  it except  by mediation,  that is,  by using  some  sort of 
significatory process, provides itself the answer.  Our noun 'house', just 
as our various visual and or tactile readings of it, marks the diverse acts 
by  which we  are able  to construe into meaningful units what we  then 
term an experience. 
Experience and world: Begging the question 
Should we  then not simply speak of 'experience' and 'world'? After all, 
the  majority of works on semantics uses  both terms  quite comfortably 
without their authors feeling compromised by the convention. To quote 
a fairly typical example: 
A promising suggestion for explaining the meaning of indicative sentences is  to 
focus  on explaining truth conditions. For it seems that the core meaning of such 
a sentence is its truth conditions: its property of being true if a certain situation 
in the world obtains and not true if the situation does not. (Devitt and Sterelny 
1990:  15) 
And yet  it is  precisely terms  such as  'experience'  and 'world' which 
beg  the very questions that semantics is  addressing. If  meaning has in 
any way to do with the manner in which human communities understand 
the world, the notion of 'experience' short-circuits the argument. For we 
want to find  out precisely what this experience of making sense  of the 
world is. 
The situation is  more dramatic with the term 'world'. Even in other 
ways fairly sophisticated approaches to the question of meaning tend to 
address in great detail one part of the problem: expression, syntax, sense, 30  H.  Ruthrof 
and the way they determine reference. On the other hand, most semantic 
theories resolve in one sweep  the remainder of the equation under the 
notion of 'the world'. And yet it is  the way in which signs  refer to the 
details covered by that collective noun which tell us about the nature of 
reference.  Hence we  cannot accept  'the world'  as  that to which  signs 
refer. Rather, the world is both that which is construed by signifying acts 
and the whole within which specific links between different kinds of signs 
take place. In this revised picture, the world as the sum of our signs and 
the arena in which we  negotiate only partially commensurable sign sys-
tems cannot be used as a measure against which meanings are checked, 
as,  for instance, in truth-conditional theories. What prevents our signs 
from being random is not the signified world but rather the constraints 
which shine through various sign systems. 
Read Only and Communicative Sign Systems (ROSS and COSS) 
Objections have been raised to treating visual and other forms of  percep-
tion  as  sign  systems,  mainly  on the  grounds  that we  did  not design 
perception as a process of communication. Since they are simply natural 
processes, any sort of perception should not be treated as a sign system. 
My counter argument is that anything that has to be deciphered, interpre-
ted, in short, read must be treated as a form of signification. Even if we 
did not literally  invent  seeing  or hearing in the  laboratory,  the  way 
cultures tend to see or hear amounts to an imposition of historically and 
otherwise differing readings on sense  data. Moreover, these construals 
qn top of sense data are learned rather than 'natural' and so carry the 
instructions of the community. However slight, any difference in readings 
so produced must result in semantic drift, a feature which is the hallmark 
of fully developed sign systems. In sum, what needs to be read must be 
regarded as a sign system. 
Paul Grice's famous distinction between natural and non-natural mean-
ings supports the view  that we are dealing with sign systems even in a 
case  where  we  only  observe  such  natural phenomena  as  spots  on  a 
person's skin (1989: 213ff.). What I would like to stress, however, is that 
the interpretive weight in either of Grice's meanings is on the part of the 
deciphering process. From this perspective, the notion of a natural mean-
ing is odd. To get around this misleading nomenclature we should empha-
size that all meanings are interpretive, even if habitually so. 
This, of course, leaves intact the distinction made by Grice, but it has 
to be redrawn in a somewhat different frame. To satisfy the reader who 
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introduce  the  notions  of  Read  Only  Sign  Systems  (ROSS)  from 
Communicating Sign Systems (COSS). This distinction could be pursued 
considerably further without, I think, requiring a shift in the axiomatic 
observations made so far. 
The semiotic corroboration thesis 
Further to my comments on the semiotic corroboration  thesis,  I  should 
add that we cannot simply assume that different sign systems picking out 
the  'same'  item from  our world produce significations  which could in 
any sense be claimed to be identical. Rather than presuppose the congru-
ence of objects projected by different kinds of signs, we should be happy 
with a less formal result.  Roman Jakobson speaks of a transmutational 
relationship between different kinds of signs in 'On Linguistic Aspect of 
Translation' (in 1987:  429).  We  recognize  objects which we  touch and 
hear and smell,  or touch and see,  or taste and touch as  'the same'. But 
this is an approximation and not any sort of  strict identification. I suggest 
that a semantic theory reflects better our intuitive grasp of things if  we 
speak of a negotiatory assimilation between signs of different systems. 
The hole in the tooth felt  by  the tip  of the  tongue is  quite different 
from the 'same' hole seen in a dentist's mirror. And it would be misleading 
to say  that the tongue has produced the wrong impression which was 
then corrected by our much more accurate vision. What Niels Bohr had 
to  say  about the  interdependence  between measuring instruments and 
subatomic events equally applies to our banal example. It is impossible 
to  separate  the  tools  of observation  from  what  is  observed.  Or  as 
Nietzsche  put it,  'there is  no right standard', and one should perhaps 
add that there is  no such thing as  no standard either; there are always 
only standards. 
This debate has a long history. In De Anima Aristotle speculates 'for 
what purpose we have several senses and not only one'. He arrives at the 
following intriguing tentative answer. First, he finds that it would be very 
difficult to perceive 'common-objects' (as against 'special-objects' which 
are signified singularly) as distinct if we had to rely on one sense alone. 
His second important observation in this context is  that of continuous 
perceptual self-reflexivity:  'we perceive that we  see  and hear'.  Here his 
resolution is an either/or. 'Either there will be an infinite regress or there 
will be some [sense] which is concerned with itself'. The 'right standard' 
in Aristotle's account is  sight, which rules the other senses by virtue of 
its close  association with the imagination. After all,  he  says,  'the name 
for imagination (phantasia) is taken from light (phaos), because without 32  H.  Ruthrof 
light it is not possible to see'. This still leaves the possibility, not further 
pursued by Aristotle, of the infinite regress of perceptual self-reflexivity. 
(Aristotle  1968:  III,  425b4ff.;  III,  2,  425bl2;  III,  2,  425bl5ff.;  III  3 
428b30ff.)  '  ' 
The two positions of the signification of objects as distinct and that of 
an infinite regress of perceiving perception can be reconciled by agreeing 
with  C.  M.  Meyers  in  'The  determinate  and  determinable  modes  of 
appearing' where he proposes that an item of perception 'is apprehended 
incompletely but is not apprehended as incomplete' (1958: 45). The fact 
that we cognize objects as complete has to do with sufficient semiosis (see 
below)  which  always  allows  for  the  thesis  of underdetermination.  No 
matter how far we  pursue the signs which constitute an object, we  can 
always discover at least one more additional sign. 
Twentieth-century physics has enlarged our available sign systems con-
siderably without, however, altering the relation we are trying to capture 
by the term 'semiotic corroboration thesis'. Take an example from John 
Gribbin's In  Search of  Schrodinger's Cat:  Quantum Physics and Reality. 
The strange behaviour of electrons in superconductivity can be explained 
'in terms of Bose-Einstein statistics' (sign system  1), by way of experi-
ments at the subatomic level  (sign system 2) and actually demonstrated 
at the level  of ordinary human perception by spinning  'helium cooled 
below 2.17 K' in a cup. Defying the laws of  classical physics, 'the spinning 
helium will never stop' (sign system 3) (1984:  146). 
What we can say beyond the minimal requirement for our significatory 
reality stipulated in the corroboration thesis is that the more sign systems 
corroborate one  another,  the more real  the world appears for  us,  the 
more we  are at home. The apparently high degree of cohesion and self-
righteousness which we  can observe in certain cultures has  to do  with 
multiple confirmations and reconfirmations of their dominant readings 
of 'the world'. 
This should not lead us to assume the inherent stability of meanings. 
Strictly speaking, it makes little sense even to speak of 'the meaning' of 
a sign. To do so would suggest a static empirical basis for the production 
of meanings, an assumption introduced by the wrong sort of analysis. It 
would be more appropriate to use a phrase such as 'the meaning process' 
of  the sign. As far as the meanings of  visual images, auditory information, 
or words and phrases are concerned, we have to be able to account for 
more or less dramatic semantic drift. Traditional standard semantic theo-
ries find it hard to cope with this phenomenon. Instead, analytical and 
formal semantics tend to treat the stability of  meaning (or sense) as given. 
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The negotiatory directionality of meaning 
Having provided a schematic axiomatic in the form of a realist textualist 
view  of the world, in which our sense of reality is  the result of a lattice 
of significatory confirmations,  we  can now proceed  to  present a  brief 
account of a directional semantics.  Such a semantic cannot assume,  as 
do the majority of current theories of meaning, that intension or defini-
tional certitude is a sound slab on which to build further and increasingly 
elaborate structures. Summing up the field, John N. Martin, for example, 
argues  that  'in  the  case  of extensional  languages  ...  the  structure  of 
intensions  is  also  homomorphic to that of referents'  (1987:  313).  This 
would mean that referents would likewise be ruled by definitions proper 
rather than by networks  of open-ended signs.  This,  I  think, is  putting 
the  horse  before the  art.  After all,  we  begin  with culturally saturated 
signs from which we can abstract their formal cousins by acts of  demateri-
alization. Intensional meaning or strict sense turn out to be a special case 
in an otherwise much less prescribed reality. 
Let  us  start,  then,  from  the  premise  that  semiosis  works,  that  is, 
communities function by way of sign systems. Having said this, we should 
not be tempted to conclude that the reason for this functioning is a fully 
shared set of meanings. There are other and more probable possibilities. 
For example, it is quite sufficient for most social interaction that partici-
pants understand more or  less what is  expected and required. In highly 
technical  exchanges  and  certainly  in  strictly  formal  signification,  this 
understanding amounts to actual identical meanings being exchanged.  5 
For the vast mass of exchanges in a natural language, no such identity 
is either required nor indeed possible. Here we are in a different landscape. 
Consider meaning production in terms of two axes:  ( 1) an axis along 
which  meanings are negotiated between the boundaries of determinacy 
and indeterminacy and (2) an axis along which meaning is viewed as  a 
directed process between the boundaries of an always underdeterniined 
directionality, on the one hand, and communicative chaos, on the other. 
In  highly  fluid  meaning  'exchanges',  utterer's  meaning  and  (re)con-
structed meaning require a generous spectrum for negotiation. The more 
ludic  the  discourse,  the  greater the  spectrum.  On the  other hand,  the 
more pragmatic and technical the exchange, the narrower the range of 
meaning possibilities. This suggests two extreme cases: fully determinate 
and directed signification and its opposite, the dissolution of signification. 
In the first case, the spectrum of meaning negotiation shrinks to zero, as 
in the strictly formal semiosis of symbolic logic (though underdetermina-
tion is still operative). In its extreme alternative we have a disrupted 'dis-34  H.  Ruthrof 
course' with an infinite number of meanings from which to choose:  the 
breakdown of social interaction. 
Let us take the signs of everyday life, as, for example, linguistic expres-
sions  or touch,  as  typical  of meaning  transactions.  We  could describe 
this  process  as  a  more  or less  directed  negotiation  between  possible 
modalities (in the broadest sense) and propositional contents. Unlike in 
Jakobson's model where the addresser and the addressee of the message 
are locked into the process of exchange as  it occurs, in this version of 
meaning production both sides,  individual as  well  as  collective readers 
are always in a position to renegotiate the modalities and proposition~ 
which they attached initially. 
6 More radically, such renegotiation, whether 
uttered or thought, is  the rule rather than the exception in  the process 
Table 1.  The Directionality of  Intersemiotic Meaning 
Kinds of  Utterance  Degree of Inter-
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of meaning 'exchange'. On this view,  misunderstanding and a myriad of 
shades  of partial  understanding  replace  the  ideal  of perfect  meaning 
transactions. 
Nor should we feel  that the most successful meaning exchange is that 
of formal signs; they are a heuristic fiction for special technical tasks not 
altogether  suited  to  the  operations of ordinary  discourse.  In ordinary 
social intercourse the wobbliness of meaning production is not to be seen 
as  a  drawback.  Rather,  it  should  be  acknowledged  as  an  important 
emancipatory  potential  which  guarantees  the  possibility  of historical 
political progress. 
7 
This may strike the reader as an unwarranted and improbable extension 
of our discussion  so  far.  I merely  state my  conviction here to indicate 
the political stakes attached to any kind of theorizing in semantics and 
the specific politics underlying the sort of stance I am offering. Not that 
standard formal  semantics  in  the  line  of Tarski and Carnap could  be 
accused  of entailing an anti-democratic attitude. What can be said and 
shown is that the will to rigorous formalization of cultural signification, 
such as natural languages, makes it difficult for the description of  meaning 
to address, for example, the complex ideological saturations we discover 
in gender- or class-dependent meanings. As we shall see later, the distilla-
tion of meaning into strict sense compatible with formally empty signs 
is the sort of procedure I have in mind. Ironically, the popular notion of 
an empty signifier very much shares this problem. 
It must be remembered in this context that Tarski himself never argued 
for  the  application of purely formal  methods  to  natural languages  or 
their colloquial ingredients:  'it is  only the semantics of formalized lan-
guages which can be constructed by exact methods' (1956a: 403). As  to 
colloquial language, 'the results are entirely negative. With respect to this 
language not only does the definition of truth seem impossible, but even 
the consistent use  of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic' 
(1956b:  153). 
Having said that formal signification is  an extreme case rather than a 
center, origin, or basis of signification, what can legitimately be regarded 
as central is the discourse practice of everyday life, in its verbal and non-
verbal forms. Along the axis of directionality, guidance is neither formally 
strict nor so loose as to invite elaborate meaning exploration. Hence the 
axis  of meaning  negotiation displays  a  range  of meaning  possibilities 
which are pragmatically sound, that is, which allow daily business to be 
conducted free from the hard rule of formal signification.· 
Any semantic must be able to cope with this phenomenon of negotia-
tion. It is important in ordinary social semiotic because even if a message 
were to be regarded as unequivocal, no sign has only information content; 36  H.  Ruthrof 
it is  also always modally charged. This means that a sign is  also always 
a socio-political act.  When a person is  asked again and again to open 
the window, the information content begins to pale before the political 
modality of oppression. To say that the meaning of the expression 'open 
the window' remains the same under these conditions is a stance which 
runs into difficulties.  Suffice  it to say here that we  will  need to debate 
whether we can speak of the meaning of a text, a sentence, or words, in 
the manner adopted in traditional semantics.  On the view  taken here, 
meaning is not a property of any sign, either linguistic or non-linguistic. 
Hence neither words  nor sentences  are by themselves  in  a  position to 
mean anything. They need to be activated in a process which is typically 
negotiatory. 
Instantiation and directional schema 
For meanings to be construed in a dialogical manner, dynamic signs must 
be  activated.  I  prefer  to  call  this  event  of activation  an  instantiation. 
Without instantiation, there is no language. Without instantiation, there 
is no signification whatsoever. Without instantiation, no meaning. Even 
langues,  formalized  language  systems,  at whatever  level  of abstraction 
are paroles, or speech events, as soon as they are formulated or read, i.e., 
instantiated. Without being instantiated in some way, they are not avail-
able.  This  suggests  the collapse  of the two  Saussurean terms  into  one 
kind, instantiation. The difference pointed to by Saussure is  thus trans-
formed into a distinction of degree between instantiations which mimic 
the  phenomenal  level  of discourse  and  those  which  we  construe  at 
different levels of formalization ( 1966:  9-15). 
Likewise, the clear distinctions postulated between syntax, semantics, 
and pragmatics introduced by William Morris and sharpened in the work 
of Carnap and his followers collapse into pragmatics (cf.  Carnap 1967a: 
79). For as  soon as  we  instantiate any natural language expression, we 
are willy-nilly performing a pragmatic speech act.  Without it,  even  the 
starkest logical observations could not be made. 
If instantiations by addressers and addressees  negotiate meanings in 
the use of an expression (typically characterized by sound waves or, more 
generally and following Derrida's usage,  an inscription) a gesture (sup-
ported by sense data or a camera), or an olfactory signification (corrobo-
rated  by  chemical  analysis),  then  signs  must  have  a  special  kind  of 
structure. The minimal requirement of a structure allowing for this sort 
of explanation is that signs are schematic. Accordingly, I have previously 
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making (Ruthrof 1992a). I now want to extend this notion to include all 
signs  such that semiosis  is  the process  of transforming. the  directional 
schemata of signs  into meanings.  And a  social  semiotic  is  the sum of 
such meaningful signs produced in a particular community. 
Pragmatically,  both  the  axis  of directionality  and that  of meaning 
negotiation are cut short according to the requirements for effective social 
interaction or imposition of political rule.  Theoretically, however, both 
axes  are  infinite.  The  exceptions  here  are  our  two  extreme  cases  of 
signification: formal signs and significatory breakdown. In the first case 
the axis of  negotiation has shrunk to zero, though the axis of  directionality 
remains infinitely underdetermined. This is the kind of picture which we 
find  in Kurt Godel's critique of formal systems (1958,  1962,  1982).  In 
the  case  of significatory  breakdown,  the  axis  of negotiation  becomes 
pragmatically infinite,  that is,  all meaning is  no meaning.  At the same 
time,  directionality  has  collapsed  to zero.  There  is  no  directionality. 
Meaning can be  explored in all directions, which turns out to be same 
as in no manner recognizable to the community at all. 
Infinite regress 
To  return to  the  broad spectrum  of socially  negotiatory  signification, 
even if purpose-rational and especially instrumental semiosis is typically 
short-lived in social practice we must not underestimate the importance 
of the  potential  of signs  for  infinite  regress.  This  notion has  become 
popular in recent years, mainly as a result of the critique of  conceptuality 
in the writings of Jacques Den·ida. We need to acknowledge, though, as 
Derrida himself does, that the idea of the fluidity of both our epistemes 
and our ontic projects has a very long history, which in Western philoso-
phy goes back to Presocratic thinkers. What is not so well known is that 
one of the very targets of Nietzsche's relativist attack, Immanuel Kant, 
draws  our attention to  the instability of concepts in the first  Critique. 
'No concept given a priori, such as  substance, cause, right, equity, etc., 
can, strictly speaking, be defined [and] the completeness of the analysis 
of my  concept  is  always  in doubt'.  The  same,  says  Kant,  applies  to 
empirical concepts (1965:  A728/B756). 
If Derrida owes far less to Kant than to Nietzsche, his immediate debt 
as  far as  his mis-en-abyme, a version of infinite regress,  is  concerned is 
to  Charles Sanders Peirce. After all,  it is not the traditional principle of 
regressus infinitus but its semiotic form that is central to Derrida's post-
structural stance. In Peirce the significatory abyss is formulated thus: 38  H.  Ruthrof 
The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it 
is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of  irrelevant clothing. 
But this  clothing never  can be  completely  stripped off;  it  is  only  changed for 
something more diaphanous. So  there is  an infinite regression here.  Finally, the 
interpretant is  nothing but another representation  ... ; and as  representation, it 
has its interpretant again.  Lo, another infinite series.  (CP 1.339) 
And a little later Peirce sums up what this  means for the process  of 
meaning constitution.  'In general,  we  may say that meanings are inex-
haustible' (CP 1.343). 
The infinite  regress  of the  sign  is  important for  two  reasons.  First, 
taking a linear perspective, to brush this ad infinitum aside makes room 
for the claim that formal semantics is  not so  far off the mark after all. 
For if meaning making is typically not an ongoing dynamic but a process 
terminated  in practice,  there  are  good  grounds  for  pairing  its  closed 
meaning entities with formal equivalents. To avoid this, we must draw a 
more  complex  picture  in  which  pragmatically  terminated  signification 
goes underground, as it were, and lingers on, revivable at crucial thematic 
moments in future social interactions. 
Second, from a multidimensional perspective, the theoretical potential 
of semiotic infinite regress is vital for our understanding of the network 
activity  of distinct sign  systems  that make up the  social  semiotic  as  a 
whole. The phenomenon of experiencing a 'world' rather something seen 
or touched is  the result of multiple sign systems impinging at the same 
time on the 'object' of our attention. Scientific apparatuses are attempts 
to reduce this multiplicity to singular systems of signification which are 
then  paired  with  other  such  isolated  systems.  The  multidimensional, 
infinite regress  of signs has been noted in somewhat different terms by 
Umberto Eco. He draws our attention to the point that one could unravel 
the total of signs of any culture by beginning with an isolated sign and 
following its myriad interconnections. 
Sufficient semiosis and community 
The end of this process is,  of course, forever  deferred,  for by the time 
the  colossal  task  of extrication  could  be  finalized,  the  culture  under 
scrutiny would have evolved further, leaving the investigators with a dead 
system, a pale shadow of the actual target of the description. Again, the 
distinction between potential and actual cultural practice is  significant. 
Both the linear and the multidimensional, regressive potential of signs is 
never fully  realized in  social interaction. Typically, both processes tend Meaning: An intersemiotic perspective  39 
to be terminated by what one could call, in Leibnizian fashion, sufficient 
semiosis.8 
Sufficiency here is determined neither by logical limits nor by a gram-
mar or langue,  but by what a community judges to be communicatively 
economical.  In technical instrumental interaction this limit is  narrowly 
circumscribed. In symbolic interaction it can be more generously negoti-
ated,  while  in  art this  very  boundary becomes  itself a  target  of ludic 
exploration. 
We  have postponed clarification of the notion of community to  the 
end. The minimal description given at the beginning was that it could be 
as small as a tiny tribe, such as a clan, or as vast as the total of peoples 
on this planet. The point is  that size is  not a vital consideration. What 
is  important  is  the  perspective  we  employ.  If we  are  interested,  for 
example,  in  the  digitalization  of cultural production,  then  the  largest 
possible description is  appropriate. For any small-scale sign usage, such 
as family idiosyncrasies, the narrowest of focuses is what we want. If size 
is  not a crucial factor in determining the role of the community in the 
production of meaning, what is? The short answer is,  'The guardianship 
over the dialectic between old and new signs'. A more elaborate explana-
tion would have to address the means of such retention and production, 
both of which can be subsumed under use.  The conservative part of use 
poses no problem in formalization and is not so interesting for the present 
argument. On the other hand, the question of  how the community accom-
modates sign invention in its social  se~iotic is  pertinent to what I wish 
to say. 
Whenever the ghetto, computer design, fashion, literature, or genetics 
offer  new significations and hence also new linguistic expressions,  such 
expressions become part of a social semiotic if they find a constituency, 
that is,  a community of users,  or die if they do not. The import of the 
community for semiosis was noted by Charles Sanders Peirce who claimed 
that the very conception of a significatory reality 'essentially involves the 
notion of a community, without definite limits, and capable of a definite 
increase  in knowledge'  (CP  5.311).  Both community and knowledge,  a 
collection of signs in Peirce's account, are conceived as open-ended and 
dynamic. Peirce does not say that human reality 'typically also goes with' 
what we  call a community.  Rather, he speaks of an 'essential' involve-
ment.  Without the notion of community we  cannot consistently think 
human signification and, consequently, not even a single social sign. 
If the community is  such a crucial 'factor' in signification, how could 
one  inscribe  it,  for  example,  into  Jakobsen's  model  of 'factors'  and 
'functions'? Community would have to be the holistic horizon of which 
all  of Jakobsen's elements are a part: addresser and addressee as  mem-40  H.  Ruthrof 
hers, context and code as the world of a culture and social semiotic, and 
message and contact as  a.  specific set of signs and a specific sign system 
channeling the message, respectively. Likewise, Jakobson's six 'functions' 
can be  regrouped to meet the demands of communicative transcenden-
tality, the frame without which human signification or social semiotic is 
not  thinkable.  This  communicative  metafunction  would  have  to  be 
regarded as the transcendental horizon for all of Jakobson's directional 
'functions':  emotive  and conative  indicating  the  personal  direction  of 
expression and impression; referential and metalingual pointing towards 
two kinds of outside, a 'denotative' non-linguistic and linguistic or 'gloss-
ing'  function;  and  poetic  and  phatic  indicating  the  direction  of self-
sufficiency  of signs  and aiming at the continuation of communication, 
respectively. 
From a realist textualist perspective, this arrangement of operational 
aspects of communication can be modified to allow for the community 
as the necessary frame for all communication and the collapsing of the 
Jakobsonian scheme into a simpler structure: community, semiotic agents 
(addresser/addressee),  social  semiotic  (context/code),  and  sign  system 
(message/contact). The advantage of  generalizing addresser and addressee 
into a  plural category caters to the semantics  of mass  communication 
(Pratt 1986); the fusion of context and code into. social semiotic empha-
sizes the textual nature of the 'referential' world (context) as the signifieds 
of social signifiers (code); and message and contact become the signified/ 
signifier  sides  of  any  specific  sign  system  activated  in  acts  of 
communication. 
As a discipline, semantics has not been keen to embrace such a fuzzy 
frame. It has shrunk the scope of its observations to a narrowly focused 
field: the sense-meanings oflinguistic expressions. As a result, as Umberto 
Eco has rightly pointed out, 'the continuum, the pulp itself of the matter 
which is manipulated by semiosis, escapes semantics' (1984: 45). I want 
to go further and say that semantics has thus not only unduly restricted 
its vision but that many of  the specific findings so produced are themselves 
not satisfactory. The meanings of  linguistic expressions cannot be argued 
appropriately if we  stay within language and merely gesture towards a 
cursorily invoked 'world'. 
Notes 
1.  A study demonstrating the reverse motion, from a formalized ideal of  natural language 
towards a holistic perspective, can be found in Martin Kusch ( 1989) in which the author 
traces stages in the writings of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Meaning: An intersemiotic perspective  41 
2.  Such a holistic project is  stipulated  but not followed  through by Martin Heidegger 
(1962:  188-213) and demonstrated in some of his later papers (1971a,  1971b,  1975). 
3.  It is  because  of the fundamental mediation which Peirce  observes with reference  to 
Kant that he writes,  'the Ding an  sich,  however,  can neither be indicated nor found' 
(CP 5.525). 
4.  Cf.  the  concluding claim of chapter 6 in my Pandora  and Occam:  On  the  Limits of 
Language and Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). Earlier in this 
chapter I suggest a semiotic reformulation of Kant's notion of schematism. 
5.  I have argued this point in detail in terms of a 'ladder of discourses' in chapter 8 of 
Pandora and Occam. 
6.  Jakobson's six 'factors' (addresser, context, message, contact, code, addressee) and six 
'functions' (emotive, referential, poetic, phatic, metalingual, conative) are designed to 
explain accurate meaning transfer even in complex situations. Cf. also Jakobson's many 
detailed studies demonstrating how this transfer works in practice; e.g., his analysis of 
multistage  communication  of the  'nevermore'  in  Poe's  'The raven'  in 'Language in 
operation' (1971: 79-81). 
7.  I  am  in  sympathy here  with  the position taken by  Jiirgen  Habermas  (1979:  1-68) 
and (1990). 
8.  Leibniz's  'sufficient'  reason should be regarded as  a pragmatic rather than a logical 
tool. There is no logical limit to when the signifying chain of empirical concepts is to 
be  terminated; there are only political-pragmatic boundaries.  Cf.  'The Monadology' 
(1934:  179-194  ).  For  a  critique  of the  principium  rationis  sufficientis  cf.  Martin 
Heidegger,  'The problem of reason', in (1969:  11-33); as well as my comments at the 
beginning of chapter 5 in Pandora and Occam. 
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